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Abstract
An unwanted thought appears to be cued easily by reminders in the environment but often the thought itself seems to
cue nothing more than the desire to eliminate it from consciousness. This unusual asymmetry in the way unwanted
thoughts are linked to other thoughts was the focus of the present research. Participants who were asked to suppress a
thought or to concentrate on it completed a task assessing the inﬂuence of priming on reaction time (RT) for word/
non-word judgments. Results revealed that suppression under cognitive load produced asymmetric priming: Priming with
the associate of a suppressed word speeded RT for the suppressed word, but priming with a suppressed word did not speed
RT for associated words. These ﬁndings suggest that thought suppression induces an unusual form of cognitive accessi-
bility in which movement of activation toward the suppressed thought from associates is facilitated but movement of acti-
vation away from the suppressed thought to associates is undermined.
  2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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All too often, we ﬁnd our consciousness drawn to a particular unwanted idea by most everything that
comes to mind. But the idea itself seems to remind us of nothing much at all—except perhaps the fact that
we would like not to think it. Unwanted thoughts have unusual gravity—an attractiveness that makes it easy
for the mind to move toward them but diﬃcult for it to move away. This power of suppression of unwanted
thoughts reveals itself in an asymmetric pattern of reminding: Although anything related to an unwanted
thought seems to remind us of that thought, the thought itself does not seem to remind us of other related
things. This potential asymmetry of associative priming in suppression was the focus of this experiment.
To grasp this asymmetry, consider the predicament of an obsessive–compulsive disorder patient: The
patient is convinced that encountering the number 7 will compel him to hurt someone. He tries not to think
about the number, yet it seems that the idea of doing math homework turns his attention to it, as does a count-
down in a game with friends, or even a glance at the clock. Cues in the environment automatically turn him
toward the number 7, as do his own random thoughts when they drift too near the number. Once his focus is
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Cognitioncaptured by the thought of 7, however, few cues in his surroundings can distract him from it. He does not seem
to think of a 7–11 store, seventh heaven, the seven deadly sins, or any of a number of other related ideas that a
person without his concern might have had come to mind on thinking of the number. The unwanted thought
seems to give rise to an asymmetry of association, in which many associates act as reminders of the unwanted
thought whereas the thought itself is something of a dead end, failing as a reminder of any of its usual
associates.
Research has demonstrated two manifestations of the gravity of suppressed thoughts—the ease of return to
suppressed thoughts, and the diﬃculty of escape from suppressed thoughts. An initial observation of ease of
return by Wegner, Schneider, Carter, and White (1987) found that after a period of thought suppression, peo-
ple instructed to discontinue suppression of the thought and instead to begin thinking about it reported more
returns of the thought than occurred without prior suppression. This is particularly likely to happen under
conditions of mental load. The ease of return illustrated by this ‘‘rebound eﬀect’’ has since been observed
repeatedly (see reviews by Abramowitz, Tolin, & Street, 2001; Rassin, 2005; Wegner, 1989; Wenzlaﬀ & Weg-
ner, 2000), including in studies with clinical samples. For example, Shipherd and Beck (1999) showed the
inability to suppress rape-related thoughts in PTSD patients, Harvey and Bryant (1998) showed the same
eﬀect for accident-related thoughts in survivors of motor vehicle accidents with acute stress disorder, and Con-
way, Howell, and Giannopoulos (1991) showed impaired suppression of negative thoughts in dysphoric indi-
viduals. Common to these studies with clinical and non-clinical populations is the ﬁnding that the unwanted
thought is faster to return to consciousness when it is being actively suppressed.
The diﬃculty of escape from suppressed thoughts has been found in studies examining the phenomenon of
hyperaccessibility in interference eﬀects. Wegner and Erber (1992) found that people suppressing a thought
under cognitive load showed interference with the task of color-naming in a modiﬁed Stroop (1935) para-
digm—more so than the interference found when people were concentrating on the thought under load. In
essence, people could not switch attention to escape from the unwanted thought, and this diﬃculty became
more pronounced with the imposition of cognitive load or distraction. This eﬀect, too, has been observed
repeatedly (e.g., Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997; Newman, Duﬀ, & Baumeister,
1997; Page, Locke, & Trio, 2005).
To account for such eﬀects, Wegner (1994) proposed an ironic process theory of mental control. The theory
suggests that thought suppression is accomplished by two cognitive search processes—an intentional operat-
ing process that consciously and eﬀortfully searches for mental contents that are not the unwanted thought,
and an ironic monitoring process that unconsciously and less eﬀortfully searches for the unwanted thought.
The processes work together to yield suppression, in that the relatively uninterruptible ironic process remains
alert to the unwanted thought and prompts the operating process to be re-initiated if the unwanted thought
returns to awareness. By maintaining such vigilance, however, the ironic monitoring process is likely to usher
unwanted thoughts into awareness whenever competing cognitive demands undermine the eﬀectiveness of the
conscious operating process. These processes might explain both the ease of return to suppressed thoughts and
the diﬃculty of escape from those thoughts.
The studies mentioned above support the notion of ease of return to, and of diﬃculty of escape from, sup-
pressed thoughts. However, to date there have been no studies that have investigated the potential asymmetry
of suppressed thoughts—the idea that thinking of things associated with the unwanted thought promptly
results in a return to the unwanted thought, but that once back on the thought, it is diﬃcult to disengage even
to closely associated thoughts. Ironic process theory suggests that the suppression of a thought should inﬂu-
ence the symmetry of associative pathways surrounding the thought. To appreciate this inﬂuence, it is worth
noting that most theories of the association of thoughts—such as Collins and Loftus’s (1975) spreading acti-
vation model—assume that the direction of associative links between thoughts is stable. The ﬂow of thought is
represented as a network of concepts or nodes, and the activation of a concept leads to activation of associated
concepts that are nearby in the network. Although particular pairs of thoughts may exhibit asymmetrical asso-
ciative links (e.g., nose leads to job more strongly than job leads to nose) these pathways of activation are
understood as given by learned patterns of word association, not by transitory variations in mental control
(e.g., Thompson-Schill, Kurtz, & Gabrieli, 1998).
Ironic process theory suggests that thought suppression under mental load should create asymmetric prim-
ing. If during suppression the operating process diverts attention away from the unwanted thought, it should
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mental load, this function of the operating process would be inhibited and pathways away from the unwanted
thought should weaken. At the same time, the ironic monitor maintains vigilance for the unwanted thought by
scanning the network for the unwanted thought, activating associated nodes in the network that lead toward
the unwanted thought. The ironic process thus should strengthen paths from associates toward the suppressed
thought.
We tested asymmetric priming in a facilitation paradigm based on Meyer and Schvaneveldt’s (1971)
ﬁnding that responses to a target word are faster when it is preceded by a semantically related word.
Although the priming eﬀect in these studies has been referred to as semantic, Shelton and Martin
(1992) found robust priming eﬀects only for associated word pairs, as determined by word association
norms (e.g., bread-butter), and not for word pairs that are semantically related but not associated in terms
of temporal contiguity in speech or text (e.g., bread-cake). Hence, in our study, we used word association
norms (Palermo & Jenkins, 1964) to obtain prime/target pairs. Our prediction was that during suppression
under cognitive load, facilitation should be greater when the prime is an associate of the suppressed word
and the target is the suppressed word than when the prime is the suppressed word and the target is an
associate.
1. Method
1.1. Overview
Participants were instructed either to think about (concentration condition) or not think about (suppres-
sion condition) one of two words (house or mountain). These mental control focus words used by Wegner
and Erber (1992) were highly familiar and had mutually exclusive sets of associated words. During the con-
centration or suppression task, participants ﬁrst verbalized their stream of consciousness for 5 min. Next,
while continuing to concentrate or suppress, they performed an associative priming lexical decision task by
indicating whether each of a series of letter strings on a computer screen was a valid word in English or a
non-word. The words included the mental control focus word, associates of that word, and unrelated words.
Cognitive load was manipulated across blocks of trials with instructions simultaneously to rehearse either a 9-
digit (high load) or 2-digit (low load) number (cf. Gilbert & Osborne, 1989).
1.2. Participants
Participants (72 women, 26 men) were undergraduates in psychology courses at Harvard University who
received course credit for participation and others who responded to advertisements and were paid for partic-
ipation. Their mean age was 20.6 years (SD = 5.8).
1.3. Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to a suppression or concentration condition and their consent was
obtained to participate in a study of how mental tasks aﬀect the way people make word judgments.
1.3.1. Stream of consciousness task
Depending on condition, participants were instructed to think or to not think about an item (house or
mountain) and to verbalize their thoughts alone in a room to a tape recorder for 5 min. Mental control instruc-
tions were those used by Wegner et al. (1987).
1.3.2. Associative priming lexical decision task
Before the task, participants were asked to continue to suppress or concentrate on the item while alone in
the room for 1 min (but without verbalizing).
For the suppression condition, the participant turned to a computer and the experimenter instructed:
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task at the same time. We will do some practice trials but ﬁrst I will go over the instructions with
you. You will see a series of letter strings on the screen. During each trial the ﬁrst letter string will
be presented for a very short duration and the second one will be presented for a longer duration.
You are to read both the ﬁrst and the second letter string but respond only to the second letter string.
If the second letter string is a word in English, press the left key. If it is a non-word, press the right
key. Try not to make mistakes, but try to be fast. Your reactions will be timed. A + will appear on
the screen before each letter string appears to show you where to look. Please respond as quickly as
you can.
Participants in the concentration condition received the same instruction, except that they were reminded to
continue to try to think of a house (or mountain) during the computer task.
For participants in both conditions, instructions for the cognitive load task were then given:
In addition to studying people’s ability to identify words, we are also interested in ﬁnding out how they
do when they perform another task at the same time. Your job will be to respond to the letter string and
at the same time remember a number that will appear before each block of experimental trials, that is, a
group of trials. You will be asked to say the number aloud at the end of each block. It is very important
that you say the number back exactly as it appears on the screen. If you fail to remember the number, the
group of trials will have to be disqualiﬁed from this study.
There were 16 practice trials followed by 180 test trials. Test trials were presented in 6 blocks with a
diﬀerent 9-digit or 2-digit number for each block. Half the trials in each block were performed under high
load and half under low load. Verbal recall of the number for each block of trials was recorded on
audiotape.
Stimuli were presented and RTs recorded using Empirisoft DirectRT v2004 software (Jarvis, 2004). The
task was based on the method of McRae and Boisvert (1998, Expt. 1). Each trial consisted of a ﬁxation
point ‘‘+’’ for 250 ms, followed by the prime for 200 ms, a mask (‘‘&&&&&&&’’) for 50 ms, then the target,
which remained on screen until the participant responded. The inter-stimulus interval was 1500 ms. Stimulus
words were the same for all participants with the same mental control focus word for suppression or con-
centration, although half the participants were presented the words in reverse order. One hundred and eight
ﬁller trials were added to allow 50% ‘‘yes’’ trials for the lexical decision of the target word so
that the proportion of unrelated targets that were non-words was .5. To eliminate the relatedness propor-
tion eﬀect (increased priming with greater proportions of trials in which the prime and target are related;
Neely, Keefe, & Ross, 1989), the proportion of valid English target words preceded by a related prime
was set at .3.
Associated words were the 4 most frequent associates of the mental control focus word according to the
norms of Palermo and Jenkins (1964). For mental control focus word house, associates included home, door,
brick, and roof. For focus word mountain, the associates were hill, high, top, and climb. To avoid ‘‘backward
priming eﬀects’’ (Koriat, 1981), prime/target pairs were chosen from the norms such that an association
exists in both directions: prime/target and target/prime. Backward priming is facilitation for prime/target
pairs in which there exists an association from the target to the prime in the absence of an association from
the prime to the target and may be a function of semantic matching/integration rather than spreading acti-
vation (Chwilla, Hagoort, & Brown, 1998). Results of a paired t-test conducted on the word-association-
strength data (Wilson, 1988) for words chosen for the current study conﬁrmed that there was no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in association strength between associate-to-focus and focus-to-associate prime/target pairs,
t(7) = .58, p = .6.
The prime/target pairs for both critical and ﬁller trials contained a random ordering of ten prime/target
pair-types (see Table 1). Additionally, constraints were placed on randomization such that the same word
(prime or target) was never presented in two consecutive trials, and that the prime and target were distinct
words in all trials.
Following the computer task, participants completed questions on their mental control eﬀorts and were
debriefed and dismissed.
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2.1. Data exclusion
Tapes for all sessions were reviewed to verify participant adherence to the number-recall instruction at the
end of each block of trials. These showed that all but 7 participants recalled the cognitive load numbers. Data
for the 7 participants who did not recall all cognitive load numbers correctly were excluded from analyses.
Other participants who were tested but whose data were not analyzed included 6 with high mean RTs
(>850 ms), 2 with over 3 errors in the lexical decision task, and 1 who did not complete the experiment. Thus,
data for a total of 86 participants were analyzed.
2.2. Mental control manipulation checks
To explore eﬀects of the mental control instruction, occurrences of the mental control focus word (house or
mountain)wereexaminedinthestreamofconsciousnessreports.Asispredictedwhensuppressionisnotdisabled
by competing cognitive demands (Wegner, 1994), participants mentioned the mental control focus words less
often under suppression (M = 5.89) than concentration (M = 18.43), F(1,85) = 24.84, p < .001. Post-task
responses to the items ‘‘How hard did you try not to think about house (or mountain)?’’ and ‘‘How hard did
youtrytothinkabouthouse(ormountain)?’’were examined ina2 · 2analysisof variance (ANOVA).The inter-
action of mental control instruction and question type was signiﬁcant, F(1,83) = 34.29, p < .001, such that sup-
pressing participants reported more eﬀort not thinking about the target (M = 3.14) than eﬀort thinking about it
(M = 2.09), t(43) = 2.76, p < .01, and concentrating participants reported more eﬀort thinking about the target
(M = 4.93) than eﬀort not thinking about it (M = 2.61), t(40) = 5.34, p < .001.
2.3. Associative priming lexical decision task
In all latency analyses, trials on which an error occurred were excluded. Trials with latencies greater than 3
SDs above the mean were also excluded.
Mean RTs were examined in three ANOVAs—one on the priming of mental control focus words by their
associates (associate-to-focus priming analysis), another on the priming of associates by mental control focus
words (focus-to-associate priming analysis), and a third examining simultaneously the priming for associate to
focus and focus to associate (priming asymmetry analysis).
2.3.1. Associate-to-focus priming
One side of the hypothesized asymmetric eﬀect of thought suppression is that during suppression under
high load associates of the suppressed thought will readily prime that thought.
To explore priming of mental control focus words by their associates, trials in which the prime was an asso-
ciate of the mental control focus word and the target was an unrelated word, another associated word, or the
Table 1
Types of prime/target pairs presented in associative priming lexical decision task
Prime Target Prime/target example
Focus Associate of Focus house/roof
Focus Unrelated to Focus house/priest
Associate of Focus Focus roof/house
Associate of Focus Associate of Focus roof/door
Associate of Focus Unrelated to Focus roof/king
Unrelated to Focus Unrelated to Focus and related to prime lamp/light
Unrelated to Focus Unrelated to Focus and unrelated to prime moon/bread
Focus Non-word house/marpis
Associate of Focus Non-word roof/marpis
Unrelated to Focus Non-word moon/marpis
Focus: Mental Control Focus Word.
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(house, mountain) as between-participants variables and cognitive load (low, high) and target type (mental con-
trol focus word, associate, unrelated) as repeated measures. The highest order signiﬁcant eﬀect was the inter-
action of instruction, load, and target type, F(2,164) = 3.77, p < .03, g
2 = .04 (see Fig. 1). Focus-word did not
appear in any signiﬁcant eﬀects, so the analysis proceeded with the decomposition of this interaction.
Simple simple main eﬀects of target type were computed for each combination of instruction and load. For
low load, standard priming eﬀects arose for concentration. A signiﬁcant simple simple eﬀect of target type
appeared for concentration under low load, F(2,168) = 4.65, p < .01, and simple simple contrasts showed that
priming with an associate speeded RT to the focus word (M = 508 ms) compared to unrelated words
(M = 557 ms), F(1,84) = 6.87, p < .01, and speeded RT to other associates (M = 517 ms) compared to unre-
lated words (M = 557 ms), F(1,84) = 7.30, p < .01. When primed by an associate, RT for focus word
(M = 508 ms) and RT for other associates (M = 517 ms) were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
Marginally signiﬁcant priming diﬀerences between target types were observed under low load for suppres-
sion, F(2,168) = 2.83, p = .06, and simple simple contrasts revealed that suppression under low load reduced
associate priming of the focus word (M = 574 ms) compared to priming of associates (M = 534 ms),
F(1,84) = 5.35, p < .02. Neither of these values was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the mean for associate priming
of unrelated words (M = 552 ms). This suggests a modest propensity for eﬀective suppression of the focus
word under low load, in that participants were slowed in thinking of the suppressed word by mention of
the word’s associates relative to their speed of thinking of one associate by mention of another.
A diﬀerent picture emerged under high load, however, where suppression produced signiﬁcant priming by
the associate (see Fig. 1). A signiﬁcant simple simple eﬀect of target type appeared under high load in the sup-
pression condition, F(2,168) = 4.63, p < .01, and simple simple contrasts showed that priming with an asso-
ciate in this condition speeded RT to the focus word (M = 549 ms) compared to unrelated words
(M = 592 ms), F(1,84) = 5.36, p < .02, and also speeded RT to other associates (M = 540 ms) compared to
unrelated words (M = 592 ms), F(1,86) = 7.00, p = .01 The inﬂuence of priming by an associate was not sig-
niﬁcant under high load for concentration, however, as the simple simple eﬀect of target type in this condition
was not reliable, F(2,168) = .94, p > .39. The inﬂuence of concentration on priming by the associate thus was
attenuated by load, whereas the inﬂuence of suppression was magniﬁed by load.
In sum, this analysis indicated that standard associative priming eﬀects surfaced for priming by associates
of the mental control focus word only under the predicted combinations of load and mental control instruc-
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Fig. 1. Mean RTs for the associate-to-focus analysis. Lexical decision RT for priming by associates of a mental control focus word with
the target an unrelated word, another associate, or the focus word as a function of instruction (concentration or suppression) and cognitive
load (low or high).
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during concentration under low load, and during suppression under high load. In a sense, then, priming from
associates to the mental control focus word seems to carry on during suppression under load much as it does
in the less complicated circumstance of concentration under low load. Associates prime the focus of suppres-
sion under load as strongly as they might if the person were merely thinking of the focus word without load.
This, then, represents one part of the expected asymmetric eﬀect of thought suppression: During suppression
under load, associates of the suppressed thought readily prime that thought.
2.3.2. Focus-to-associate priming
The other side of the hypothesized asymmetric eﬀect of thought suppression is that associative priming
from target to associate will not occur during suppression, especially when under high load.
This analysis examined the other part of asymmetric priming eﬀects of suppression. Trials in which the
prime was the mental control focus word and the priming target was either an associated word or an unrelated
word were examined in an ANOVA with instruction (concentration, suppression) and focus-word (house,
mountain) as between-participants variables and cognitive load (low, high) and target type (associate of mental
control focus, unrelated) as repeated measures (see Fig. 2). Although main eﬀects and interactions were not
signiﬁcant, contrasts were conducted to test expectations in the four load by instruction conditions. In each
condition, priming eﬀects from target to associate were compared with priming from target to unrelated word.
These simple simple eﬀect tests revealed signiﬁcant priming for concentration in the low load condition,
F(1,84) = 4.54, p < .04, with reduced RT for associates (M = 540 ms) compared to unrelated words
(M = 578 ms). This facilitation eﬀect was eliminated for suppression under low load, as RT for associates
(M = 561 ms) resembled that for unrelated words (M = 576 ms), F(1,84) = 2.64, p > .1. Signiﬁcant priming
was found for concentration under high load, F(1,84) = 4.91, p < .03, with reduced RT for associates
(M = 543 ms) compared to unrelated words (M = 574 ms). These eﬀects were not paralleled, however, by
any priming eﬀect in suppression under high load, F < 1, as there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in mean RT
for associates (M = 584 ms) and for unrelated words (M = 576 ms). So, although the absence of an overall
signiﬁcant interaction here suggests that these comparisons be viewed with circumspection, the pattern reveals
that the associative priming from target to associate that appears during concentration does not surface in
suppression, and is clearly absent in suppression under high load.
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Fig. 2. Mean RTs for the focus-to-associate analysis. Lexical decision RT for priming by a mental control focus word with the target an
unrelated word or an associate as a function of instruction (concentration or suppression) and cognitive load (low or high).
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To examine the asymmetry directly, a further analysis compared priming eﬀects in two directions—from the
mental control focus word to its associates, and from the associates to the mental control focus word. This
involved comparison of prime/target pairs in which: (a) the prime was the mental control focus word and
the target was an associate of the focus word, and (b) the prime was an associate of the mental control focus
word and the target was the focus word. This ANOVA explored the RT eﬀects of instruction (concentration,
suppression) and focus-word (house, mountain) as between-participants variables and cognitive load (low,
high) and pair type (prime = mental control focus and target = associate vs. prime = associate and tar-
get = mental control focus) as repeated measures.
This analysis revealed a signiﬁcant interaction of instruction, pair-type, and load, F(1,82) = 8.73, p < .004,
g
2 = .10 (see Fig. 3). There was no higher-order interaction with focus-word, so lower-order eﬀects were not
examined further. To examine the 3-way eﬀect, simple simple main eﬀects of pair type were computed for each
combination of load and instruction. Only two were signiﬁcant: During suppression under high load, priming
from focus word to associate was marginally signiﬁcantly slower (M = 585 ms) than priming from associate to
focus word (M = 549 ms), F(1,43) = 3.66, p < .06; and during concentration under low load, priming from
focus word to associate was signiﬁcantly slower (M = 539 ms) than priming from associate to focus word
(M = 508 ms), F(1,41) = 4.73, p < .04. Thus, in concentration under low load and in suppression under high
load, priming from associate to focus word was faster than priming from focus word to associate. As reported
above, in the case of concentration under low load, priming from focus word to associate was nevertheless
signiﬁcant, whereas in suppression under high load, it was not. Taken together, these results indicate directly
the asymmetry of priming produced when people try not to think of something under cognitive load, and the
absence of such eﬀects in the other conditions suggests that priming asymmetry is uniquely produced by sup-
pression under load.
3. Discussion
In the associative priming lexical decision task, participants who were trying not to think of a word under
the mental load imposed by rehearsing a 9-digit number showed an asymmetric pattern of priming between the
word and its associates. In lexical decisions, their judgments of the suppressed word were faster when primed
by the word’s associates. However, when primed by the suppressed word itself, participants did not show facil-
itation for associates. This can be understood in terms of the gravity of suppression—the extraordinary pull of
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Fig. 3. Mean RTs for the priming asymmetry analysis. Lexical decision RT for an associate primed by a mental control focus word (focus
word to associate) or for the focus word primed by its associate (associate to focus word) as a function of instruction (concentration or
suppression) and cognitive load (low or high).
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cognitive load, however, priming was symmetric: There was increased facilitation for associates of the focus
word when primed by the word itself, and there was increased facilitation for the focus word when primed by
its associates.
Network models have indeed been used to explain information processing biases. For instance, Bower’s
(1981) associative network approach proposes that there exist nodes for mood/aﬀect that are connected to
nodes for concepts in the semantic network. Thus, when certain concept nodes are activated, activation
spreads to the connected aﬀect node. The research presented here does not focus on aﬀect, but instead on
the dynamic property of the strength of activation in the semantic networks. In particular, it underscores
the inﬂuence of conscious cognitive strategies—in this case, thought suppression—on the strength of activa-
tion between interconnected nodes.
The asymmetry of priming for suppression under cognitive load reveals eﬀects predicted by ironic process
theory (Wegner, 1994). In suppression under load, the suppressed thought does not prime its associates even
while it is primed by its associates. The unintentional ironic process initiated by suppression is not undermined
by load and so leads toward the unwanted thought, whereas the intentional operating process also initiated by
suppression is undermined by the load and so does not prompt the unwanted thought to prime its associates.
Like the gravitational ﬁeld surrounding a body of great mass, suppression under load makes a thought easy to
return to and diﬃcult to escape. Thus, suppression of an unwanted thought may ironically turn it into an ide ´e
ﬁxe, incessantly returning the thought to itself and precluding other thoughts from entering into awareness.
Early theories of psychopathology focused on the ide ´e ﬁxe—a thought that intrudes repeatedly upon con-
sciousness and becomes diﬃcult to control—as the hallmark of mental disorder (Janet, 1894; Ribot, 1881).
Although theories of psychopathology have grown more sophisticated than this, there remains evidence that
unwanted intrusive thoughts surface as symptoms across a surprising range of disorders, from anxiety and
obsessive–compulsive disorders to depression and beyond (Clark, 2005).
The asymmetry in the way unwanted thoughts are linked to other thoughts is apparent in several forms
of psychopathology—such as loss or threat-related thoughts in depression and anxiety. Indicators such as
performance on the emotional Stroop task reveal that, whereas nonclinical participants show increased
interference for current concern related stimuli, clinical patients in general show increased interference
for both personal relevance and the negativity of the material (see review by Williams, Mathews, & MacLe-
od, 1996). Thus, the more unwanted a thought is, the higher the predicted interference. Some explanatory
models have focused on the strengthening of pathways in the semantic network (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg,
1985; Bower, 1981). The strength of pathways determines the speed of activation in the pathway, which in
turn determines the speed of response in reaction time tasks. The focus of the current study was the tran-
sitory increase in strength of certain pathways (from associates to the unwanted thought) and transitory
decrease in strength of other pathways (from the unwanted thought to its associates) during active attempts
at suppression. Thus, the study highlights the transitory gravity of suppression—the extraordinary pull of
unwanted thoughts and the diﬃculty of getting away from them while actively suppressing. These ﬁndings
raise questions for future research on individual diﬀerences in mental control; future research should inves-
tigate this phenomenon more directly with clinical samples, particularly in disorders of perseverative
thinking.
It is often the case that obsessive thoughts have no obvious beginnings. For example, in the case of patients
with obsessional thoughts, it is nearly impossible to identify when the unwanted thought of contamination or
asymmetry ﬁrst gained acute emotional signiﬁcance. According to Wegner’s theory of synthetic obsessions
(1989), one contributing factor in the etiology of pathological obsession may very well be the tendency to sup-
press them. Indeed, active resistance is a deﬁning feature of obsessions. Moreover, although the persistence of
unwanted intrusive thoughts characterizes clinically signiﬁcant obsessions, several studies have established
that the experience of unwanted intrusive thoughts is a normative phenomenon (Purdon & Clarke, 1993; Sal-
vokskis & Harrison, 1984). These studies show that what diﬀerentiates ‘‘clinical’’ intrusive thoughts from
‘‘normal’’ ones is that they are more frequent, distressing, perceived to be less controllable, and more strongly
resisted using misguided mental control strategies such as thought suppression (Janeck & Calamari, 1999;
Rachman & de Silva, 1978). The current study elucidates a potential cognitive mechanism by which suppres-
sion may facilitate the progression from normal unwanted thoughts to obsessions.
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